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Racial Discrimination in Urban
Housing Markets
INTRODUCTION
InChapter 2, we extended traditional theories of residential location
and urban spatial structure to incorporate durable housing stocks and
nonmarket production of some housing attributes, as well as the impact
of multiple employment centers. In this chapter, we consider what is
perhaps the most serious form of interdependence in urban housing
markets: racial prejudice and discrimination.
We shall begin with a brief survey of previous empirical research on
the extent and causes of residential segregation in American cities. This
summary offers no original findings, but it does provide a concise
statement of the available evidence. We shall then proceed to examine
how racial discrimination affects housing prices and housing consump-
tion in urban housing markets. The final section of this chapter considers
the broader questions of how housing-market discrimination affects the
patterns of urban growth and development in U.S. metropolitan areas.
SEGREGATIONIN U.S. CITIES
Animportant aspect of urban housing markets is the token repre-
sentation of blacks in suburban areas. There is more than a germ of truth
to the characterization of an increasingly black central city being stran-
gled by a noose of white suburbs. Black Americans have not participated
in significant numbers in the rapid postwar suburbanization of the popu-
lation. In 1970, the 216 metropolitan areas of the United States were 12
percent black. However, 21 percent of central-city populations were
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black, as contrasted with only 5 percent of suburban populations.' If
southern metropolitan areas, with their suburban (agricultural) black
population, are omitted, the underrepresentation of blacks in the sub-
urbs becomes even more apparent. In 1970, blacks constituted 17 per-
cent of the population of central cities of metropolitan areas outside the
South but only 3 percent of their suburban populations.2
Housing-market segregation does not end with the exclusion of
blacks from suburban areas; blacks also are intensely segregated within
central cities. Karl and Alma Taeuber have calculated segregation
indexes for central cities in 1940, in 1950, and in 1960, using census block
statistics.3 These indexes, which assume values between zero and 100,
measure the extent to which observed racial patterns of residence by
block differ from a pattern of proportional representation. A value of
zero indicates a completely even distribution of blacks, i.e., the propor-
tion of blacks on every block is the same and equal to the proportion in
the entire central city. A value of 100 indicates the opposite situation, a
completely segregated distribution; i.e., each block contains only whites
or blacks. The higher the value of the index, the higher the degree of
residential segregation. Values for the 156 central cities analyzed in 1960
ranged from 60 to 98, with only a few cities having values in the lower
range of observations; only 5 cities had values below 70,4
DETERMINANTSOF SEGREGATION
Numerousexplanations 'have been offered for the virtually total
segregation of blacks. Common contentions are that blacks are concen-
1U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population and Housing: United States
Summary, "General Demographic Trends for Metropolitan Areas, 1960 to 1970." Final
Report, PHC (2)-i (GPO, 1970), Table B, p. 5.
2Much has been made recently of data from the current population surveys which
suggest that suburban black populations may have grown more rapidly in the past few
years. These data should be regarded with considerable caution, however, since small
sample sizes do not permit any meaningful evaluation of these aggregate changes. For
example, itis not possible from these statistics to determine whether the aggregate
increases in black suburban populations are occurring in all SMSA's, are limited to a few
SMSA's or particular sections of the country, or whether they take the form of a dispersed
(integrated) pattern of settlement, an acceleration in the growth of small suburban ghettos,
or simply the spilling over of central-city ghettos into the suburban ring. It should be clearly
understood that the implications of these aggregate changes cannot be determined without
more information about the nature of the changes.
3Karl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber. Negroes in Cities: Residential Segregation
and Neighborhood Change (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965).
4St. Louis is no exception to these generalizations: the city of St. Louis had
segregation indexes of 92.6 in 1940, 92.9 in 1950, and 90.5 in i960.58 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
trated within particular neighborhoods because they are poor, because
they spend too little on housing, or because they differ systematically
from the majority white population in terms of other characteristics that
influence residential choices. These socioeconomic hypotheses are eas-
ily evaluated empirically, and several studies have examined them.5
Without exception, these, studies have determined that only a fraction of
the observed pattern of black residential segregation can be explained by
low incomes or other measurable socioeconomic differences.
Although, many tests of the socioeconomic hypotheses rely on
elaborate statistical methods, even the most primitive analyses are
sufficient to raise serious doubts. If low income explains the concentra-
tion of blacks in central cities, it should also be true that most low-
income whites live in central cities, and that most of the small number of
middle-class blacks Jive in the suburbs. Yet, as the data presented in
Table 3-1 illustrate, in six of the eleven largest metropolitan areas, more
low-income whites live in the suburban rings than live in the central
cities. In most cases, the proportion of low-income whites living in the
suburbs is not substantially different from, the proportion of middle-
income whites living in suburban areas. For example, 52percentof
Detroit's poor white families live in suburbs. In contrast, black house-
holds are heavily concentrated in the central cities in all 11 SMSA's. In
the Detroit SMSA only 8 percent of poor black families reside in the
suburbs.
Moreover, relatively few high-income blacks (over $10,000 per
year) live in the suburbs. Indeed, the percentage of high-income blacks
living in suburban areas is less than that of low-income whites in all
eleven SMSA's. Thus, in St. Louis, 37 percent of high-income blacks
Jive in the suburbs, compared with 86 percent of high-income whites and
61 percent of low-income whites. Clearly, money is not the principal
explanation for the underrepresentation of high-income blacks in the
suburbs.
Another explanation holds that the segregation of blacks is the
result of a desire "to live with one's own kind" and is a normal and
healthy manifestation of a pluralistic society. The immigrant colonies
that are evident even today in many cities are offered as evidence of the
normality of this behavior. It is true that a number of identifiable ethnic
5Taeuber and Taeuber, Negroes in Cities; A. H. Pascal, "The Economics of Housing
Segregation," Memorandum RM-5510-RC (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, Nov.
1967); John R. Meyer, John F. Kain, and Martin Wohi, The Urban Transportation Problem
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), Chap. 7; and Davis McEntire, Residence

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































060 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
and nationality groups have exhibited some degree of segregation in
American cities. However, the differences between their experience and
that of black Americans are so marked as to invalidate the historical
analogy.6
The intensity ,of black residential segregation is greater than that
documented for any other identifiable subgroup in American history.
Moreover, segregation of these other groups has declined over time,
while that of blacks has remained at a high level and, possibly, has
increased. Finally, today metropolitan areas are very different places
than they were thirty or fifty years ago. They are far less compact and
employment is much more dispersed. Widely scattered employment
centers impose heavy commuting costs on many ghetto residents. Com-
parable disincentives did not exist when the ethnic colonies flourished.
To conclude that "voluntary" self-segregation is responsible for
much of the current pattern of black residential segregation, it is neces-
sary to assume that blacks have much stronger ties to their community
than do other groups. Although the apparent appeal of slogans such as
"black power" and "black is beautiful" may be considered evidence of
a growing cultural pride and sense of community among blacks, it is
impossible to assign much weight to this increased awareness as an
explanation of durable segregation patterns. While we recognize the
difficulties of interpretation, recent surveys of black provide
little support for the self-segregation hypothesis. In 1966,68 percent of a
random sample of American blacks interviewed by the Harris Poll
indicated a preference for living in integrated neighborhoods. This frac-
tion is somewhat larger than the 64 percent expressing this opinion in
1963, in spite of the growth of black militancy and cultural pride.
Similarly, only 20 percent of blacks interviewed in 1963, and 17 percent
in 1966, indicated a preference for living in all-black neighborhoods. The
fraction of northern blacks preferring all-black neighborhoods was even
smaller (8 percent in 1966), and the fraction of middle- and upper-income
respondents in the North was smaller still (6 percent).7
In spite of the lack of any systematic evidence supporting the self-
segregation hypothesis, it is difficult to dismiss. The problem lies in
the fact that it is virtually impossible to determine conclusively the role of
6The most comprehensive comparative study of the segregation of blacks and other
ethnic groups is by Stanley LiebersOn, Ethnic Patterns in American Cities (Glencoe, Ill.:
Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). Similar findings are reported in Otis Dudley Duncan and
Stanley Lieberson, "Ethnic Segregation and Assimilation," American Journcil of Sociol-
ogy 64, no. 4(Jan.1959): 364—74;andKarl E. Taeuber and Alma F. Taeuber, "The Negro
as Immigrant Group," American Journal of Sociology 69, no. 4 (Jan. 1964).
7WilliamBrink and Louis Harris, Black and White (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1967), pp. 232—33.Racial DiscriminationUrban Housing Markets 61
self-segregation as long as traces of white community antagonism
toward black efforts to leave the ghetto remain. The physical dangers
of moving out of the ghetto may be less today than they were in the
past, but many subtle and indirect forms of intimidation and discourage-
ment still exist.
Today, evidence of the methods used to enforce housing-market
segregation is more difficult to obtain than formerly. Open occupancy
laws, which forbid discrimination in the sale and rental of housing on the
basis of race, and a decline in clear-cut community approval for such
practices have caused opponents of open housing to resort to more
subtle and secretive methods.
Until very recently, however, the most effective techniques used to
enforce segregation could hardly be called subtle. Deed restrictions
(racial covenants), the appraisal practices of the FHA and of private
lending institutions, the actions of local officials, and the practices of
real-estate agents were among the most important of these devices.8
Because residential patterns display a great deal of inertia, the effect of
these now discredited methods will long be felt. Even if there were no
future resistance to black efforts to leave the ghetto, the cumulative
effects of decades of intense discrimination would have a long-lasting
impact.
PRICEDISCRIMINATION AND HOUSING CHOICES
Anyattempt to evaluate the effects of racial discrimination in urban
housing markets on housing prices and on the housing choices of white
and black households must distinguish among several interrelated, but
analytically distinct, questions. First, how does the price of housing
inside the ghetto compare with the price of similar bundles outside the
ghetto? A broad interpretation of this question would include considera-
tion of the determinants of ghetto housing prices. Second, how much do
black households have to pay for housing outside the ghetto? Specifi-
cally, do they systematically pay more than whites? Third, what are the
full costs of obtaining housing outside the ghetto for white and black
households? A narrow view of these costs would include the time and
money spent in house hunting and any other incidental outlays. A
broader conception would include the psychic costs of house hunting in
8McEntire, Residence and Race; Charles Abrams, Forbidden Neighbors:A Study of
Prejudice in Housing (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955); and Robert Thompson,
Hylan Lewis, and Davis McEntire, "Atlanta and Birmingham: A Comparative Study in
Negro Housing" in Studies in Housing and Minority Groups, Nathan Glazer and Davis
McEntire, eds. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960).62 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATIQN
white neighborhoods and the fears of possible adverse consequences of
moving into such a neighborhood. Fourth, what are the characteristics of
the ghetto housing supply? Is a full range of housing types available
there, and are scarcities adequately reflected in the relative prices of
different bundles? To make matters still more difficult, the
answer to these and similar questions will almost certainly vary by time
and locality. Moreover, there are a variety of short-run dynamics that
must be disentangled from the general condition in the market. These
short-run dynamics may be quantitatively less important than the mar-
ket's general state but may, nevertheless, strongly influence the percep-
tion of the market by observers and participants alike. Finally, the
answers to these questions may differ by housing submarket. In particu-
lar, conditions may differ substantially between owner and renter hous-
ing.
DISCRIMINATIONAND HOUSING PRICES
Inspite of some recent improvement in the access of blacks to
previously closed portions of the housing supply, limitations on the
residential choices of black Americans remain great enough to justify the
working assumption of separate black and white submarkets. As
recently as 1964, housing ads in St. Louis newspapers carried separate
listings for "Colored."9 In general, blacks can purchase or rent property
outside of neighborhoods which convention and practice have sanc-
tioned for black occupancy only with great difficulty and inconvenience,
and by incurring additional costs.
Whites, by contrast, may purchase or rent dwelling units anywhere,
including the ghetto, although, owing to prejudice or other reasons, most
live in predominantly white residential areas. This creates a situation in
which location rents for equally accessible housing need not be the same
within the two markets. Moreover, the characteristics of ghetto and
nonghetto housing stocks differ significantly.
Our preceding discussion has emphasized the importance of stocks
in determining the behavior of urban housing markets. New construction
each year is but a fraction of the total housing supply. For all, metropoli-
tan areas, only 29 percent of occupied dwelling units in December 1959
had been constructed during the previous decade. Stocks are an even
more important portion of the ghetto housing supply. Only 13 percent of
9lnstitute for Urban and Regional Studies, Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.,
Urban DecayinSt. Louis, Working Paper INS 10, March 1972, p. 46.Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets 63
the units occupied by blacks in 1959 had been built during the previous
ten years. These averages are strongly weighted by southern metropoli-
tan areas, where black neighborhoods are more dispersed and often
contain vacant land on which some new construction for blacks takes
place. In the northeast, only 8 percent of the black supply was less than
ten years old; the fraction was even smaller (5 percent) in the north
central region.
Most of the increased supply needed to house rapidly growing
ghetto populations consists of units shifted from the white market,
generally at the periphery of existing ghettos. For example, in the north
central region, during the decade 1950—60 units formerly occupied by
whites are nearly ten times as important as new construction in terms of
additions to the black submarket (Table Incontrast, few units
shifted from black to white occupancy during the same period. For
example, in the north central region, only about 7 percent as many units
shifted from black to white occupancy as shifted from white to black.
DETERMINATIONOF GHETTO HOUSING PRICES
Althoughthe term location rent will be used in references to the
ghetto housing stock, the determination of quasi rents on ghetto housing
bundles is based on considerations different from those connected with
nonghetto properties. Except for a few southern metropolitan areas, new
construction is an unimportant source of additions to the black submar-
ket. As a result, transport savings between a particular location and the
periphery are virtually irrelevant in determining the level of location
rents in ghetto areas. Instead, the level is determined almost entirely by
the price at which units are shifted from the white market. This, in turn,
will depend on the price level prevailing in the white market and on
whether black buyers are able to buy or rent units at the white submar-
ket price, must pay a premium, or can obtain them at a discount.
Whether blacks must pay a premium in order to add units to the
ghetto is similar, but not identical, to the question of whether blacks pay
more than whites for housing of otherwise identical characteristics. The
distinction is that all types of housing may not be added to the ghetto in
each period. Most researchers have concluded that blacks do pay more
10The ten-to-one ratio is obtained by allocating the "other" category in Table 3-2
(primarily units changed through conversions and mergers) in the same proportion as units
whose previous occupant is known. Based on this assumption, in 1959 more than half of









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets 65
than whites for housing of comparable size and quality, but this view is
by no means unanimous.1' This is, of course, a factual question, but
while many such questions are easily resolved, determining the facts in
this instance is not so simple. In order to ascertain whether there is a
difference in prices paid by whites and blacks for comparable housing, it
is necessary first to standardize the complex and heterogeneous bundle
of residential services. In fact, one original motivation of our study was
our assessment that, as yet, no one had been able to carry out this
standardization sufficiently well to demonstrate conclusively that mea-
sured price differences are not simply the result of systematic differ-
ences in the housing consumed by whites and blacks.
A recent study by Thomas King and Peter Mieszkowski may come
closest to coping with the difficult conceptual and empirical problems
that have prevented a satisfactory empirical test of the price-discrimina-
tion hypothesis.12 King and Mieszkowski estimated least-squares regres-
sions for 220 rental units in New Haven, Connecticut, using rent per 100
square feet of living space as the dependent variable, and both supply
and demand factors as explanatory variables. These included detailed
descriptions of the size, quality, and other physical characteristics of the
dwelling unit; a number of neighborhood variables, such as location and
racial composition; and several household characteristics, including
race, family size, and the education of the head of the household.
The principal difference between the equations estimated by these
authors and those presented in Chapter 8 of this book is King and
Mjeszkowskj's use of household characteristics as explanatory varia-
bles. Our analysis uses the estimated percent black in the census tract to
"McEntire, Residence andRace; Gary S. Becker, The Economics of Discrimination
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Beverly Duncan and Philip M. 1-lauser,
Housing a Metropolis—Chicago (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960); Otis D.
Duncan and Beverly Duncan, The Negro Population of Chicago —A Study in Residential
Succession (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Martin J. Bailey, "Effects of
Race and Other Demographic Factors on the Values of Single-Family Homes," Land
Economics 42, no. 12 (May 1966): 215—20; and Richa'rd F. Muth, "The Variation of
Population Density and Its Components in South Chicago," Papers and Proceedings of the
Regional Science Association 11(1964); Chester Rapkin, "Price Discrimination Against
Negroes in Rental Housing Market" in Essays in Urban Land Economics (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966); Ronald G. Ridker and John A.
Henning, "The Determinants ofResidential Property Values with Special Reference to Air
Pollution," Review of Economics and Statistics 44, no. 2 (May 1967); Chester Rapkin and
William Grigsby, The Demand for Housing in Racially Mixed Areas (Los Angeles• and
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960); Luigi Laurenti, Property Values and Race:
Studies in Seven Cities (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960).
'2Thomas King and Peter Mieszkowski, "Discrimination, Segregation, and the
Price of Housing," Journal of Political Economy 81, no. 3 (May/June 1973): 590—606.66 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
describe the ghetto and does not include descriptions of the race or any
other characteristics of the occupants, except how long they have lived
in the unit.
King and Mieszkowski experiment with a variety of specifications
to describe racial differences in the occupants of the unit and the
neighborhood. Their first equation, which includes only the race of the
occupant, indicates that black renters in New Haven pay 11 percent
more than white renters. When King and Mieszkowski add the percent-
age of nonwhites on the block (obtained from New Haven's 1967 census
pretest), the combined effects of these two variables indicate that a black
family living in the ghetto will pay 19 percent more than a white family
living in an all-white neighborhood. A virtually identical estimate was
obtained when the race dummy was replaced simply by the percentage
of blacks on the block; rents are 18 percent higher in all-black neighbor-
hoods than in all-white neighborhoods. From these results, King and
Mieszkowski conclude that "in our sample the blacks and whites in the
ghetto both pay the same rent, which is much higher than in the white
interior.' '13
Kingand Mieszkowski test a variety of hypotheses about the prices
paid by whites and blacks at the ghetto boundary but caution that their
estimates of these boundary effects are based on few observations and
are much less reliable than the estimates described above.14 Still, their
results indicate that blacks in the black boundary pay more than whites
living in the same location, but both pay less than in the ghetto. More-
over, in the white boundary, blacks pay more than whites but not more
than whites in the white interior.'5 Finally, their analyses indicate that
blacks and whites pay the same rent in the white interior. King and
Mieszkowski do not report how many blacks live in the white interior
but note that only fourteen blacks live in either the white boundary or the
white interior.
'3lbid., p. 29.
14King and Mieszkowski's analysis of boundary effects is motivated by the previ-
ously cited article on price discrimination by Bailey and by the brief, but widely cited,
theoretical statement by Bailey which motivates his empirical analysis. Bailey, "Effects of
Race," and Martin J. Bailey, "Note on the Economics of Residential Zoning and Urban
Renewal," Land Economics 35 (Aug. 1959): 288—90.
'5A unit is considered in the ghetto if it is located in a block 60—100 percent black, and
if the surrounding blocks are 60—100percentblack. A unit is considered in the black
boundary if the block is 60—100 percent black, and the surrounding blocks are 0—60 percent
black, or if the block is 0—60 percent black, and the surrounding blocks are 60—100 percent
black. A unit is considered in the white boundary if the block is 20—60 percent black and the
surrounding blocks are 0—60 percent black, or if the block is 0—20 percent black and the
surrounding blocks are 20— 100 percent black. A unit is considered in the white interior if
the block is 0—20 percent black and if the surrounding blocks are 0—20 percent black.Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets 67
TABLE3-3
Discrimination Markups Paid by Nonwhite Occupants in
10 Large Metropolitan Areas—i 960







































NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
An unpublished study by Robert F. Gillingham provides indepen-
dent estimates of discrimination markups for a number of large metro-
politan areas in 1960, including St. Louis.'6 Shown in Table 3-3.are two
sets of estimates of the discrimination markups obtained for the 10 large
metropolitan areas included in the Bureau of Labor Statistics Compre-
hensive Housing Unit Survey (CHUS). The first set of discrimination
markups are those obtained when only dwelling unit characteristics,
obtained from the CHUS, were included in the model. The second
column of estimates are those obtained when neighborhood characteris-
tics obtained from the 1960 Census of Population are included in the
equation.
18Robert F. Gillingham, "Place to Place Rent Comparisons Using Hedonic Quality
Adjustment Techniques," Research Discussion Paper No. 7, Research Division, Office of
Prices and Living Conditions, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Washington, D.C., March
1973.68 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
The statistics shown in Table 3-3 illustrate two important proposi-
tions. First, the estimates obtained from the complete model provide
powerful support for the hypothesis that black renters in a large number
of U.S. metropolitan areas paid higher rents for comparable housing in
1960 than white renters. Of the 10 large metropolitan areas included in
Gillingham's analysis, there was evidence of positive discrimination
markups for rental housing in 9 of them. The estimate for St. Louis,
incidentally, was 13.4 percent in 1960: Gillingham's second finding,
which is vividly demonstrated by a comparison of columns 1 and 2 in
Table 3-3, relates to the importance of complete and proper specification
of the hedonic price equations. GiIlingham' s results strongly indicate that
those analyses that fail to include neighborhood descriptors have
seriously underestimated the size of the discrimination markups imposed
on black households by housing-market discrimination. When measures
of neighborhood quality are not included in the regressions, positive dis-
crimination markups are obtained in only 5metropolitanareas and the
magnitude of the markups in the remaining areas are in all cases con-
siderably smaller.
In spite of the serious methodological and empirical problems
involved, we conclude that most types of housing are more expensive
inside the ghetto, and that a premium is required to shift bundles to the
ghetto submarket.17 This is based on our review of previous empirical
studies, on our own findings presented in Chapters 5through10, and on
a broader range of descriptive material and a priori reasoning.
Prices at active margins of the ghetto then maybe depicted as equal
to the price in the white submarket plus a premium, or discrimination
markup. This markup may be some constant amount, as in Equation
3-1, or may be proportional to value, as in Equation 3-2.
(3-1) PkW + a
(3-2) Pkw(l + /3)
where
p=monthlyrent or market value in the ghetto submarket
for housing type k;
pkW =monthlyrent or market value in the nonghetto submarket
for housing type k;
a, /3=ghettohousing price markups.
'7Further complications are introduced by the fact that the magnitude of such
discrimination would be expected to differ among metropolitan areas and over time in the
same area. The size of the premium blacks must pay to shift housing from the white to the
black market will depend on the extent of prejudice, the degree of organization of the
market, and the instruments available to those wishing to contain the expansion of the
black submarket.Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets 69
The prices in Equations 3-1 and 3-2 apply, of course, to comparable
housing bundles, i.e., identical collections of attributes. This require-
ment is easier to satisfy in principle than in practice. As we will illustrate
in subsequent chapters, the ghetto housing market is far from a micro-
cosm of the region's housing market. The supply of housing services in
the ghetto differs systematically from that located outside, and many
types of housing are completely unavailable. Blacks who seek to pur-
chase housing outside the ghetto incur high transaction costs. They will
often find realtors and other agents less than helpful, many hours of
effort are typically required, and the householder and his family may
meet with a hostile reception from their new neighbors.
The discrimination markup, shown in Equations 3-1 and 3-2, closely
resembles the concept of a discrimination coefficient employed by Gary
Becker in his classic work, The Economics of Discrimination. However,
there is a crucial difference. Becker's discrimination coefficient is a
measure of the individual seller's taste for discrimination and indicates
the amount of money he would be willing to forgo to avoid selling to
blacks.'8 The discrimination markup in our formulation depends only in
part on an individual seller's unwillingness to sell to blacks. Becker's
model depicts atomistic sellers with God-given tastes acting indepen-
dently; the mechanism presented by us may easily describe much more
collusive behavior and a relatively high level of market organization.
individual sellers may be motivated in part by individual prejudice, but
real or imagined community pressures and the behavior of intermedi-
aries are hypothesized to play a central role in affecting the white seller's
willingness and opportunities to sell or rent to a black. In the not so
distant past, these discriminatory actions were highly organized and
such behavior was enforced by codes of "ethics" among market agents
and even by FHA appraisers. Today the degree of organization appears
to be less, or at least less visible.
This formulation can also provide an explanation of peripheral
expansion of the ghetto, something which isentirely absent from
'81n hisbrief discussion of residential discrimination, Becker concludes that
"Negroes still (1957) appear to pay significantly more than whites for housing in cities like
Chicago, where rent control and restrictive covenants have been abolished for several
years" (p. 79). He adds that "this can be interpreted as an equilibrium difference that will
be maintained until public policies or individual tastes change" (p. 79). But his subsequent
discussion gives greater emphasis to explanations other than consumer "tastes for discrimi-
nation." For example, "since Negroes are prevented from living in white neighborhoods,
their population can expand only within and on the periphery of existing Negro neighbor-
hoods. iftheyexpand within these neighborhoods, their rents will increase relative to rents
for whites.... Thisrent differential, although caused by an adjustment lag, would appear
10 be a long run differential" (p. 80). In essence, a careful reading of Becker reveals that he
places very little emphasis on tastes for discrimination as an explanation of residential price
discrimination.70 HOUSINO MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Becker's model. When excess demand within the ghetto becomes too
great, i.e., when the price within the ghetto exceeds the white submarket
price plus the markup [p w + a] orp w[1+ f3] ,unitsare shifted from white
to black occupancy at the ghetto's periphery. The persistent expansion
at the periphery and the infrequent purchases of housing by blacks
outside the ghetto can, perhaps, be explained by much larger discrimina-
tion markups for properties distant from the ghetto—markups that
exceed the potential transportation-cost advantages or general benefits
of all other locations. Larger markups for housing bundles located far
from the ghetto than for comparable bundles on the boundary of the
ghetto can occur ii there is a greater consensus about keeping blacks out
of more remote neighborhoods. When rapid growth of the black popula-
tion makes it apparent that expansion must take place somewhere, it is
channeled into adjacent neighborhoods.
The discrimination markup would be a monetary increment in either
the rent or purchase price paid by blacks in order to add a unit to
ghetto. From our assessment of the available evidence, we would place
greater emphasis on the transaction costs of finding a suitable dwelling
and persuading the owner or landlord to make a transfer, on the problems
of acquiring information, and on the psychic costs of moving into a po-
tentially hostile environment. If a black chooses a dwelling within the
ghetto, he can expect to be courted by both white and black real-estate
agents and lenders. If he tries to locate outside the ghetto, the reception he
receives from these agents is likely to be far less enthusiastic.19 Returning
to Equations 3-1 and 3-2, these factors can be thought of as an additional
once-and-for-all transactions cost for both rental and owner-occupied
structures. These transactions costs will vary by location within a
metropolitan area; in general, they will be highest in all-white neighbor-
hoods farthest from the ghetto, but other factors may influence them as
well. For example, they may be lower in communities with active fair-
housing groups. Equations 3-3 and 3-4 depict these ghetto markup
equations with the transactions costs, Ai,added.It should be empha-
sized that while there may be elements of continuing costs, in general
they are one-time costs for each dwelling unit. We would predict,
therefore, that black households will be more willing to incur them when
they expect to remain in the community for a long time.
(3-3) Pk't =PkW+ a + Ai
(3-4) = (1 + /3) + Al
'9Testinionydescribing the conditions encountered by black households in St. Louis
who attempt to acquire housing outside the ghetto is contained in U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, Hearing, held in St. Louis, Missouri, January 14—17, 1970.Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets 71
There are two other explanations of ghetto expansion and price
determination that are worthy of mention. One of these, like the hypoth-
esis outlined above, produces a positive discrimination markup. The
other also provides for peripheral expansion of the ghetto but produces a
negative discrimination markup.
A positive discrimination markup and peripheral expansion of the
ghetto might occur if blacks prefer to live in or near the ghetto and are
therefore willing to pay more for adjacent properties. In the case of
•blacks employed at suburban workplaces, this preference for ghetto
locations must be great enough to offset the transportation-cost savings
accruing from residence in suburban areas. Under these circumstances,
ceteris paribus, rents would be higher in the black submarket because
blacks regard the ghetto as a more desirable location.
A third hypothesis produces a negative markup. It postulates that
whites residing on the periphery of the ghetto are more willing to sell to
blacks than whites living further from the ghetto because of their reluc-
tance to live near blacks, their fear of racial invasion, and their belief that
property values will plummet with black entry. Black entry into a white
neighborhood located on the periphery of the ghetto is interpreted as the
first step in an inevitable process through which the neighborhood will
rapidly become all black. If white fears are great enough in these
transitional neighborhoods, blacks may be able to purchase or rent
housing bundles for substantially less than in the white market. Since
black entry into a white neighborhood distant from the ghetto does not
signal the same inevitable process, whites do not panic and prices remain
firm.
In those cases where white panic depresses prices in the short run,
the value of the discrimination markup would be negative, and the ghetto
would expand as long as blacks were willing to pay a price equal to the
white submarket price on the periphery of the ghetto plus the negative
markup. Bargains obtainable at the periphery would discourage blacks
from paying higher prices to reside in all-white neighborhoods far from
the ghetto.
All three of the above hypotheses outline mechanisms for peripheral
expansion of the ghetto. The first and second produce higher housing
prices in the ghetto than outside for both black and white households,
while the third produces lower prices in the ghetto for all households.
The second hypothesis seems highly implausible, given the preceding
discussion of self-segregation. A choice between the first and third can
be made by determining empirically whether blacks must pay a premium
or can obtain their units at a discount. The preponderance of evidence
suggests that, typically, they pay a premium.
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primarily on the level in the white market and the discrimination markup
does not imply that accessibility considerations are irrelevant in describ-
ing the surface of location rents within the ghetto. In a manner parallel to
conventional models of residential location, the location rent surface
within the ghetto depends on the distribution of black jobs and the
savings in transport costs afforded by various residential locations.
Given a rapid redistribution of black jobs, it is possible that some parts of
the ghetto might become more accessible to the new employment cen-
ters.
Location rents would be bid up in these residential areas, causing
the shape of the location rent surface within the ghetto to deviate from
that outside. However, these factors should be temporary if the previous
discussion of the processes that shift housing from the white to the black
submarket is valid. As long as the markup for shifting units to the black
submarket is the same everywhere at the periphery, the location rent
surface within the ghetto should in general resemble that in the white
market plus or minus a markup. Deviations would occur only if the
markup, a, were larger at some boundaries than others.
In fact, there is evidence that differences of this kind exist. Some
ethnic neighborhoods resist black entry more strongly than neighbor-
hoods with less clear identities, and suburbs with small black ghettos
may be more successful in limiting their expansion through zoning and
other political means. Forces such as these would increase the discrimi-
nation markup. Alternatively, if the ghetto is bounded by groups sympa-
thetic to the plight of blacks, the markup might be lower.20
BOUNDARYEFFECTS AND SHORT-RUN
DYNAMICS
Theforegoing discussion of price discrimination has been con-
cerned primarily with the overall level of housing prices in the ghetto and
in all-white neighborhoods. The analysis fails to consider a number of
aspects of housing-market structure and dynamics which may result in
temporary price deviations in transitional areas. The persistent belief
that prices are lower in the ghetto than outside may be fueled by the
short-run dynamics accompanying the transition of neighborhoods from
20For example, the tendency for the ghetto to expand through Jewish neighborhoods
has been noted by a number of observers. Ernest W. Burgess commented on this question
in an early paper and remarked that "no instance has been noted... wherea Negro
invasion succeeded in displacing the irish in possession of a community. Yet, frequently
Negroes have pushed forward in the wake of retreating Jews. ..." ErnestW.
Burgess, "Residential Segregation in American Cities," Annals of the American Academy
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all-white to black occupancy. These factors should have their greatest
impact in the market for owner-occupied units.
Real-estate transactions are complex and time consuming. Because
both the supply of available properties and potential purchasers are so
heterogeneous, selling a house typically takes weeks or months. The
effects of this heterogeneity on both the supply and demand side are
reinforced by the great expense incurred in buying a house, including
both search and transactions costs, which may exceed 10 percent of the
value of a single-family unit.2' Few persons are willing or able to pay
cash for the real estate they purchase; therefore, they must locate a
mortgage lender and file a mortgage application. More time is required
for credit checks, appraisals of the property, and loan processing. These
steps, always difficult and time consuming, are compounded in areas in
the path of ghetto expansion, which are expected to become part of the
ghetto. The transition from white to black occupancy may be accompa-
nied by a changeover in the institutions, i.e., real-estate agents, banks,
and other mortgage lenders, who perform these crucial functions.
Far too little information exists on the role of these institutions in
the real-estate market and in the maintenance of racial segregation, but
casual empiricism suggests that different institutions perform these func-
tions in black and white neighborhoods.22 In addition, although there is
little hard proof, it is widely believed that banks and other lenders are
less willing to finance properties in the ghetto or in areas expected to
become part of the ghetto. Redlining by insurance companies may
contribute to the problems of financing properties in ghetto neighbor-
hoods, or in neighborhoods in the path of expansion. The Kerner
Commission carried out a survey of approximately fifteen hundred
homeowners in areas of Boston, Cleveland, Detroit, Newark, Oakland,
and St. Louis. Over 6 percent of the homeowners did not have basic fire
insurance, and in Detroit 12 percent were without it.23
Even if there were no unusual problems associated with selling
property in areas that are expected to become part of the ghetto,
temporary price declines could occur if many whites panicked and
attempted to sell their properties quickly, fearing that the anticipated
black invasion would lower property values. Such fears may be encour-
aged by block-busters, who in many areas have managed racial transi-
tion to provide speculative profits. We know of no careful study of
block-busting, but journalistic accounts are plentiful and altogether con-
sistent with our views of the structure of urban housing markets.
2lJohn P. Shelton, "The Cost of Renting Versus Owning a Home," Land Economics
44, no. 1 (Feb. 1968): 59—72.
22McEntire, ResidenceandRace, chaps. 13 and 14.
23President's Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory
Commission on CivilDisorders (GPO,Mar. 1968), Appendix II.74 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
One of the most suggestive of these accounts has been provided by
Jack Rothman.24 In a brief article, Rothman emphasizes the contribu-
tions to racial segregation made by the separate sets of institutions
serving the ghetto and nonghetto housing markets. He classifies brokers,
for example, into two categories, "block-busters" and "lily-whiters."
The block-busters are the more deliberately destructive. Once a Negro
somehow manages to move into a white neighborhood, these brokers make
their entrance and work over the area. Through house-to-house canvassing,
relentless telephone solicitation, use of the mails and by various other
means, they create an atmosphere of panic in the neighborhoods and high-
pressure the white residents into selling. They open up one block at a time,
saturating block A with Negroes and then going on to block B. "Do you
want your kids to play with colored kids?" goes their sales talk. "Do you
want to be the last white family left on the block? Do you want to lose a
fortune on your house?" Characteristically, they approach a home owner
with a cash offer and the (often fallacious) news that Mrs. Jones down the
street is selling to a Negro family. Emphasis is placed on the urgency of
selling immediately, before the value of the house nose-dives.25
The "lily-whiters" in Rothman's are brokers operating in
white neighborhoods who serve only whites. They support the actions of
block-busters by discontinuing operations in transitional neighborhoods,
and by not showing properties to their white customers in these areas.26
A precipitous decline of white demand for properties in these neighbor-
hoods is the inevitable result.
Rothman and others contend that banks and other lending institu-
tions support this operation by making it difficult for nonwhites to obtain
a mortgage when they attempt to buy in awhite area and by discriminat-
ing against whites who want to buy in a changing neighborhood.
If the block-busters are able to persuade enàugh whites that prop-
erty values will fall with black entry, they may cause it to happen, at
least temporarily. Declines in white demand in anticipation of certain
black invasion, occurring in conjunction with efforts by many white
owners to sell their properties, could temporarily depress house values.
Block-busters make their profit in these situations by buying properties
at less than the white market price, pZV, and holding them for resale to
black households at the ghetto price, p1° + a. The difference between the
panic price and the ghetto price is the block-buster's profit and his
incentive to perform this function. In circumstances such as these, some
24Jack Rothman, "The Ghetto Makers," Nation 10, Oct. 7, 1961. Reprinted in part in
Race and Poverty: TheEconomicsofDiscri,nination, John F. Kain, ed. (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969).
25Rothman, "Ghetto Makers," p. 123.
26For accounts of this "steering" of white and black buyers in St. Louis, see U.S.
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white residents may receive less than the price of housing in white
neighborhoods; at the same time, blacks purchasing the property may
have to pay a discrimination markup.
Several researchers have studied the effects of racial integration on
the prices of single-family homes.27 In general, the issue is whether the
entry of blacks into a previously all-white neighborhood causes property
values to decline. The problem is formulated in these terms because many
real-estate brokers, lenders, and other crucial agents in the real-estate
market allege it to be the case, and because John Q.Publicis encouraged
to share their belief.
In our opinion, the most interesting and careful study of this kind
has been carried out by David Karlen for the South Shore Community in
Chicago.28 Karlen' s investigation assumes additional importance, more-
over, because it considers the same housing market as that studied by
Martin Bailey a decade earlier. Bailey's interesting, but to us confusing,
analysis of sales of single-family units on Chicago's South Side has been
widely cited as evidence that price discrimination does not exist in urban
housing markets. From his analysis, Bailey concludes:
On the major question ... whetherslum-dwellers and non-Caucasians pay
more than others for equivalent housing, these data not only fail to support
this idea but on the contrary point to the opposite situation. If values within
the slum were to be as high or higher than those outside, there would be a
jump in values just as one crossed the boundary into the slum to offset the
decline in values as one approaches it.29
27The best-known study of this type is Laurenti, Property Values and Race. Other
studies of housing prices in racially changing neighborhoods include: W. M. Ladd, "Effect
of Integration on Property Values," American Economic Review 52, no. 4 (Sept. 1962);
Erdman Palmore, "Integration and Property Values in Washington, D.C.," Phyion 27
(Spring 1966); Erdman Palmore and John Howe, "Residential Integration and Property
Values," Social Problems 10, no. 1 (Summer 1962); Rapkin and Grigsby, The Demand for
Housing in Racially Mixed Areas; Frederick E. Schietinger, "Race and Residential Prop-
erty Values in Chicago," Land Economics 30 (Nov. 1954); Joseph P. McKenna and
Herbert D. Werner, "The Housing Market in Integrating Areas," Annals of Regional
Science 4, no. 2 (Dec. 1970); Donald Phares, "Racial Change and Housing Values:
Transition in an Inner Suburb," Social Science Quarterly (Dec. 1971); Allen Dobson,
"Price Changes of Single Family Dwelling Units in Racially Changing Neighborhoods"
(Ph,D. diss., Washington University, 1970); T. E. Billette, "Sante Fe: A Study of the
Effects of Negro Invasion on Property Values," American Journal of Economics and
Sociology 16, no. 2 (Jan. 1957): 15 1—62.
28David H. Karlen, "Racial Integration and Property Values in Chicago," Urban
Economics Report #7, University of Chicago, April 1968. The boundaries of South Shore
Community studied by Karlen are 67th Street on the north, Stony Island on the west, 73rd
Street on the south, and Lake Michigan (from 67th to 71st) and Yates Ave. (from 71st to
73rd) on the east.
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Bailey's work stands out as one of the very few empirical analyses to
find no evidence of a price markup. As with most other empirical
studies, it is not without conceptual and empirical failings.30
In 1960, the South Shore Community area of Chicago had a popula-
tion of 133 blacks and 56 other nonwhites out of a total population of
26,662. However, it was directly in the path of ghetto expansion, and by
1966 was perhaps three-fourths black. In an effort to distinguish between
the effects of racial integration and other factors affecting property
values, Karlen compared the experience of the South Shore Community
with that of a control area in the northern part of the city. The control
area resembled the South Side community in most respects, but it was
not in the path of ghetto expansion.
In spite of Karlen' s efforts to match the test and control areas to the
greatest possible extent, properties in the control area were more expen-
sive at the beginning of the period than those in the South Shore
Community. Therefore, he constructed the relative-price indexes which
appear in Figure 3-ito show the movements in relative prices in the two
areas. The analysis indicates that property values in the South Shore
Community were declining relative to those in the North Shore test area
prior to the time of black entry.31 Between 1956 and 1961, house prices
in the South Shore Community studied declined by 18 percent in relative
value—the values in the test area declined from .84 of the values in the
control area in 1956 to .69 in 1961. For most of this period, the area was
all white.
Once the area was clearly identified for black occupancy, however,
property values in the South Shore Community increased relative to
those in the North Shore test area. Karlen estimates that between 1962
and 1966 values in the South Shore Community increased both abso-
lutely and relatively; theincrease relative to the control area being from
.65 to .78.
Karlen offers the following explanation of this price behavior. (1)
Before blacks began moving in, white demand decreased drastically
because of a widespread expectation among whites that the South Shore
Community was next in line for expansion of the ghetto. (2) During the
30A detailed critique of Bailey's analysis is contained in Mitchell Stengal, "Racial
Price Discrimination in the Urban Rental Housing Market" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard Univer-
sity, 1970).
31Karlen reports that the values in the South Shore Community had been declining
before the 1960 census and that significant black entry to the area began about 1962. This
entry was accompanied by a doubling of the rate of sales activity in the neighborhoods, a
pace that was maintained until the area had become predominantly black; a "normal" level
of activity was reached again in 1966 (Karlen, "Racial Integration and Property Values" [p.
11]).Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets
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FIGURE 3-1
Relative-Price Index (Test Area/Control Area) with Two Regression Lines
[Source: David H. Karlen, "Racial Integration and Property Values in
Chicago," Urban Economics Report No. 7, University of Chicago, April
1968, p. 26.]
transitionperiod, around 1960—61, only a few blacks sought housing in
the area, and the black demand for homes was insufficient to offset the
decrease in white demand. (3) Once the area was clearly identified for
black occupancy (about 1961), large numbers of blacks sought housing
there, and "their increased demand eventually more than compensated
for both the decrease in white demand and the increase in the supply of
white homes for sale."32
Karlen makes no attempt to determine whether the prices of proper-
ties in the South Shore Community at the end of the transition period
were higher or lower than the prices of comparable units in comparable
all-white areas safe from ghetto expansion. He does, however, conclude
that "because Negro demand could not be diffused over the metropoli-
tan area, it had to be concentrated on the few areas like South Shore
where a breakthrough had been made, thus driving values up. And South
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Shore's proximity to the Negro ghetto, in the absence of open housing,
made it a logical area for such a 'breakthrough.'
Similarfindings were reported by Donald Phares in a study of
property values in University City, Missouri. Phares' study—the second
of two recent studies of property values in University City—is especially
pertinent to this book, because University City is located in St. Louis
County, contiguous to St. Louis city.34
The housing in University City is generally of high quality. In 1970,
61 percent of the 17,000 dwelling units were owner-occupied, a decline
from 66 percent in 1960. As we detail in later chapters, good-quality
single-family units for black households are in short supply in St. Louis.
The opening up of University City to black occupancy provided St.
Louis blacks with an opportunity to obtain types of housing that had
been expensive or completely unavailable to them previously.
The first black purchases in University City occurred in 1964 in the
northeast section of the city. Only 88 residents, or one-tenth of! percent
of University City's 51,249 population, were black in 1960. A decade
later University City's 9,281 black residents comprised 20 percent of a
somewhat smaller total population, and 42 percent of University City's
elementary school students were black. Phares analyzes changes in
property values in University City between 1958 and 1967. Since the first
sales to blacks occurred in 1964, he is able to analyze property values
before black entry and during the period of racial transition (1964—67).
The data used by Phares are sales and assessed valuation for 1,030
single-family units. An important aspect of his analysis is a comparison
of the price experience in elementary-school districts undergoing differ-
ing amounts of integration during the period. These comparisons among
neighborhoods are based on indexes of sales prices to 1970 assessed
valuation. Fortunately, the assessment data were of unusually high
quality, since a comprehensive reassessment of the area had been done
recently by an independent assessment organization. Use of a ratio of
selling price to assessed valuation in order to examine price changes
incorporates some adjustment for quality differentials into the analysis, a
major problem in most studies of property values.
Phares classified neighborhoods into two groups according to the
amount of integration that occurred during the period: (1) no or very
little integration (less than 10 percent nonwhite enrollment in the elemen-
tary schools in 1967), and (2) significant integration (more than 20
percent nonwhite enrollment in the elementary schools in His
33Ibid.
34Phares, "Racial Change and Housing Values."
35Phares also reported the analysis using three categories: (1) no or little integration;
(2) moderate integration; and (3) substantial integration (ibid.).Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets 79
findings, summarized in Figures 3-2a and 3-2b, are similar to those
obtained by Karlen. Relative prices (Figure 3-2a) in areas with significant
entry exhibits fairly regular declines between 1958 and 1964, i.e., prior to
black entry, and a rapid rise after 1964. By contrast, relative prices in the
control area, i.e., areas with no or mild nonwhite entry, fluctuate
considerably but exhibit no trend either before or after entry. The
number of transactions in the area with significant integration increased
sharply after 1964, whereas the number of transactions in the control
area exhibits a slight upward trend over the entire period 1958—67
(Figure 3-2b).
Black entry to the suburbs in St. Louis during the decade 1960—70
was not limited to University City. Joseph P. McKenna and Herbert D.
Werner carried out a study similar to Phares' for the Normandy School
District in St. Louis County.36 Until 1965, when blacks began to buy and




Relative-Price Index by Degree of Transition, University City, Missouri,
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Transacflons
renthomes in the eastern and southern sections of the district, the entire
district, which includes twenty-nine separate municipalities, was occu-
pied almost exclusively by whites. By December 1970, four of the eight
elementary schools were integrated, while the remaining four had no
black students.
The methodology used by McKenna and Werner is virtually identi-
cal to that used by Phares: ratios of sales prices to assessed values were
computed for twenty-five-hundred transactions, and those ratios were
then grouped by elementary-school districts. The entire area had been
reassessed in 1958 by the same firm that reassessed University City.
From the data shown in Figure 3-3(A). McKenna and Werner conclude
that the difference in prices in integrating and nonintegrating areas is
small, and that if integration has an effect "it is probably the least
important of all of the factors influencing price."37 At the same time,
37Ibid., p.131.
FIGURE 3-2b
Number of Transactions by Degree of Transition, University City, Missouri,











Ratio of Sales Price to Base Price and Number of Transactions by In-
tegrated and Unintegrated Areas of the Normandy District, byYear[Source:
Joseph P. McKenna and Herbert D. Werner, "The Housing Market in
Integrating Areas," Annals of Regional Science 4, no. 2 (Dec. 1970):
131—33.]
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they conclude from the transactions data that integration greatly
increases the turnover of houses (Figure 3-3(B)).Their observations
about these market dynamics are virtually identical to those offered by
Phares and Karlen.
EFFECTSON LOCATION RENTS
Theimpact of housing-market discrimination on the metropolitan
surface of location rents is not limited to its effect within the black
market. By reducing the white submarket supply of residential sites in
particular parts of the metropolitan region, it affects the level and spatial
distribution of location rents in the white market as well. The central
location of the ghetto causes location rents in central areas to be higher
than they would be if this pattern of housing-market discriniination did
not exist. It is true that some centrally employed blacks would choose to
live in these centrally located residential areas even if there were no
discrimination. However, many blacks employed at central workplaces
and nearly all blacks employed in suburban areas would not bid for these
central locations were it not for restrictions on their choice of residence.
Of course, this also means that the current demand by blacks for
suburban sites is less than it would be if no housing-market discrimina-
tion existed. The net effect of the present restrictions is to increase the
demand for sites in central areas where the ghetto is located and to
decrease relatively the demand for suburban locations. The rapid growth
of the black market represents a source of demand for central-city
properties that might not exist in the absence of segregation. An offset-
ting influence which might increase the demand for central-city proper-
ties in the absence of residential segregation would come from centrally
employed white workers who willingly pay higher transport costs to
avoid living in integrated housing. Thus, while the suburbanization of
black households may reduce total demand for central-city properties,
the white demand for central locations should increase if .the spatial
distribution of employment remains unchanged.
HOUSINGQUALITY, EXTERNAL EFFECTS, AND
COLLECTIVE GOODS
Thepreceding discussion of the effects of residential discrimination
on metropolitan housing markets, while eliminating some serious defi-
ciencies of existing "economic" theories of residential location, fails to
consider a number of factors that influence the behavior of urban
housing markets and that reinforce the effects of residential segregation.Racial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets 83
As has been discussed more fully in Chapter 2, existing "economic"
theories of residential location entirely ignore housing stocks, despite the
fact that stocks are more important in housing than in almost any other
market.
Given a heterogeneous and durable stock of structures and neigh-
borhood attributes, different price relationships may exist between the
black and white submarkets for various kinds of housing. It is not hard to
imagine circumstances where blacks have to pay a premium for adding
certain types of housing bundles (of particular size, quality, or other
characteristics) to the ghetto, while other types of bundles may be
cheaper there. Such a result could arise if housing bundles become less
desirable to whites once they become part of the ghetto. It seems likely
that few whites will wish to live in all-black neighborhoods, particularly
deep within the ghetto. Thus, housing bundles located in the ghetto
might be cheaper than otherwise identical ones outside without causing
large numbers of whites to buy or rent them. This difference, which
might be termed the ghetto discount, could exist for some kinds of
properties at the same time blacks were finding it necessary to pay a
premium to add other kinds of units to the ghetto.
Assume that there are only two kinds of dwelling units, high quality
and low quality. The conditions outlined above could produce an excess
supply (defined in terms of the white market price) of low-quality
dwelling units within the ghetto coexisting with an excess demand for
high-quality units. For this excess-supply condition for low-quality
dwelling units to be consistent with the continued expansion of the
ghetto and the payment of a premium for high-quality units, it is only
necessary that the supply price of providing high-quality units by means
of ghetto expansion (the price of high-quality units in the white market
plus the discrimination markup) be less than the cost of providing such
units through the conversion of low-quality units (the price of low-
quality units in the black submarket plus the cost of upgrading).38
Though the growth of the ghetto has not been systematically studied
in these terms, most descriptive accounts seem consistent with a mecha-
nism of this kind. These accounts indicate that the peripheral expansion
of the ghetto tends to occur in the best adjacent neighborhoods rather
than in the worst, and that disproportionate numbers of blacks moving
into previously white neighborhoods are members of higher-income
groups.39 This peripheral expansion of the ghetto serves high-income
blacks in very much the way that the flight to the suburbs serves upper-
381n order for this condition to persist, it may be necessary for the depreciation rate or
the filtering of high-quality units to be more rapid inside the ghetto than outside.
most detailed analyses of ghetto expansion are found in Duncan and Duncan,
The Negro Population of Chicago; and in Taeuber and Taeuber, Negroes in Cities.84 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
income whites and establish high-quality, high-income residential neigh-
borhoods far from the adverse influences of low-income households, they
of lower-income groups.
"Ghetto suburbs" usually do not have as extensive a buffer of
middle-income housing as that which separates high-income white sub-
urbs from low-income neighborhoods. With the continued growth of the
ghetto, the neighborhoods of well-to-do blacks are continually invaded
by lower-income groups. This causes a decline in neighborhood quality
and upper-income blacks are forced to migrate to a new "ghetto sub-
urb." Because they are seldom able to leapfrog in the manner of high-
income whites and establish high-quality, high-income residential neigh-
borhoods far from the adverse influences of low-income households,
they pass houses down to lower-income groups more rapidly.
It is well to remember that the ghetto is not simply black. It is also
poor. The concentration of poverty in central-city ghettos produces a
host of adverse environmental conditions that make the central city and
its core (both ghetto and nonghetto) less attractive to both middle-
income whites and middle-income blacks. The only difference is that the
former are under less compulsion to live there. They can move to
independent political subdivisions a safe distance from the ghetto, where
they may vote service-taxation packages appropriate to their tastes and
incomes. Middle-income blacks seldom have this option.
In the postwar period, white central-city residents, unable to obtain
the desired services-tax packages by political means in the central city,
voted with their feet and millions moved to the suburbs. Today, the
concentrated poverty of the ghetto makes it difficult, if not impossible,
for central citiesto provide the quantity and quality of services
demanded by middle- and upper-income whites and blacks—especially
while these areas continue to rely largely on the property tax for
revenues.
The experience of St. Louis is typical of large northern metropolitan
areas. During the decade 1950—60, the central city lost 168,000 whites
and gained 61,000 blacks. The suburbs gained 429,000 whites but only
18,000 blacks. Similar data for other metropolitan areas are presented in
Table 3-4. These trends, noticeable earlier in the century, became
pronounced with the rapid migration of blacks northward beginning with
the Second World War. Between 1940 and 1960, the white populations of
the twenty-four metropolitan areas with over a million inhabitants in
1960 increased by 12 million; and their black populations, by 4.2 million.
Even though these twenty-four included rapidly growing cities such as
Los Angeles, San Diego, and Houston, only .2 percent of the white
population increase (net) occurred in the central cities, as compared with
83 percent of the black increase (net). These changes became even moreRacial Discrimination in Urban Housing Markets 85
TABLE3-4






Population City (Thousands) (Thou sands)
24 Atlanta 91 65 140 —6
12 Baltimore —113 100 324 7
7 Boston —130 23 278 3
15 Buffalo —83 34 259 4
3 Chicago —399 3201,076 34
21 Cincinnati —32 31 166 3
11 Cleveland —142 103 367 2
20 Dallas 171 72 111 —17
5 Detroit —363 182 904 19
16 Houston 250 90 87 7
22 Kansas City —9 27 204 2
2 Los Angeles—Long Beach 388 169 1,668 77
17 Milwaukee 61 41 133
14 Minneapolis—St. Paul —47 8 366 —
I New York —476 340 1,177 67
13 Newark —97 63 226 27
18 Paterson-Clifton-Passaic 3 15 286 6
4 Philadelphia —225 153 700 38
8 Pittsburgh —91 18 257 7
9 St. Louis —168 61 429 18
23 San Diego 212 20 231 3
6 SanFrancisco—Oakland —148 67 554 25
19 Seattle 70 11 171 —
10 Washington, D.C. —173 131 553 18
SOURCE:U.S.Bureau of the Census, U.S. Census of Population: /960, Selected
Area Reports, StandardMetropolitanStatistical Areas. Final Report PC (3)—iD (GPO,
1963), Table 1.
pronounced during the decade 1950—60, when the black population of
these twenty-four central cities increased by 2.1 million. Large numbers
of whites were displaced by this growth of central-city ghettos; these
same cities lost more than 1.4 million white inhabitants during the
decade. Finally, between 1960 and 1968, these same central cities lost an
additional 2 million whites, while gaining an additional 1.9 million86 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
blacks.4° During the same eight-year period, the white population of the
suburban rings of these metropolitan areas increased by 6.8 million,
while the black population increased by .6 million.
In summary, housing-market segregation modifies the logic of "eco-
nomic" models of residential location in several important respects. It
creates a demand for certain locations (typically the inner part of large
central cities) that is unrelated, or only weakly related, to their access
advantages. Black households, physically limited in their choice of
residential locations, must bid sites in the segregated market away from
whites who wish to be near their place of employment. The result is a
radically different pattern of price levels than is derived in most theories
of residential location. In most large U.S. metropolitan areas, there is a
rapidly growing "captive" demand for residences within the ghetto. This
demand is principally for low-quality housing. These locations are acces-
sible to the workplace of many blacks, but as jobs—particularly blue-
collar jobs—suburbanize, ghetto sites provide no geographical advan-
tage to increasing numbers of blacks. Indeed, for those blacks employed
in suburban areas, the ghetto is perhaps the poorest possible location.
In evaluating the effect of the growing central ghetto on metropoli-
tan development, it is crucial to bear in mind that because so many
blacks have low incomes, the growth of the central ghetto also implies an
increased concentration of poverty, a growing aggregation of low-quality
housing, and an impaired ability to provide urban services on the part of
cities. These factors make the city still less attractive to higher-income
groups and increase the relative desirability of the suburbs.
These elements, important in a static analysis, assume even greater
significance in a dynamic framework. The rapid dispersal of employment
from the central parts of metropolitan areas is amply documented else-
where.41 The effect of employment dispersal should be to reduce the
demand for centrally located residences and to cause a downward shift
in the location rent surface in central areas. If centrally located units
become less expensive, the location rent savings from commuting to
suburban locations will decrease. Under these changed circumstances,
many more centrally employed middle- and upper-income groups would
find it advantageous to choose centrally located neighborhoods. The fact
that the quality of many units would be lower than desired presents no
serious obstacle, provided that the units can be obtained cheaply
40U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, SeriesP-23,Special
Studies (formerly Technical Studies), no. 27, Trends in Social and Economic Conditions
in Metropolitan Areas (GPO, 1969), p. 2.
4tJohn F. Kain, "The Distribution and Movement of Jobs and Industry," in The
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enough. The most structurally sound of these units could be renovated
and modernized, while the least valuable could be demolished and
replaced by new structures. However, these possibilities have not been
realized, inasmuch as the rapid increases in the black population have
largely offset the effects of employment dispersal.
RACIALDISCRIMINATION AND THE WORKPLACE
DOMINANCE ASSUMPTION
Theevidence presented in this chapter that black households are
severely limited in their residential location choices raises serious ques-
tions about the appropriateness, in the case of black households, of the
workplace dominance assumption employed in the revised theory devel-
oped in Chapter 2. Given the rather extreme geographic restrictions on
black residential choice identified in this chapter, it is only prudent to
inquire whether this limitation has any effects on the location of jobs
held by black households.
The theory of residential location presented in Chapter 2 postulates
a fixed workplace and obtains the households' optimal residence loca-
tion in terms of a housing cost—travel cost tradeoff. Because the resi-
dence choices of black households are so severely constrained, it can be
argued plausibly that a theory which employs the opposite assumption,
i.e., that blacks have a fixed residence location and select a workplace
with reference to the effects of transport and other distance-related
costs, would better explain the behavior of black households.
In a paper published in May 1968, one of the authors presented
empirical tests of this alternative model of the interrelationships between
the workplace and residence choices of black workers.42 In that paper,
which used data for the Detroit and Chicago metropolitan areas, Kain
attempted to test the hypotheses that racial segregation in housing
markets: (1) affects the geographic location of black employment and (2)
reduces black job opportunities; and that (3) suburbanization of employ-
ment following the Second World War has seriously aggravated the
problem. These hypotheses were tested using an exceedingly simple,
single-equation, reduced-form model, which employed the convenient
and realistic assumption that black households could live in a few
compact neighborhoods.
In his paper, Kain identified three ways in which housing-market
segregation might affect the distribution and level of black employment.
42John F. Kain, "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan
Decentralization," Quarterly Journal of Economics 82, no. 2 (May 1968): 175—97.88 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
First, the time and money costs required to commute to jobs distant
from black residence areas may impose costs on blacks high enough to
discourage them from seeking employment there. Second, blacks may
have less information about and less opportunity to learn of jobs distant
from their place of residence or those of their friends and neighbors.
Third, employers located outside the ghetto may discriminate against
blacks out of real or imaginary fears of retaliation from white customers
for "bringing blacks into all-white residential areas," or they may feel
little pressure not to discriminate. Similarly, employers in or near the
ghetto may discriminate in favor of blacks.
To test these hypotheses, Kain estimated a series of multiple regres-
sion models for Detroit and Chicago using the black percentage of total
employment in each of 98 workplace areas as the dependent variable and
a series of proxy variables to represent the factors causing blacks to be
underrepresented in distance workplaces as explanatory variables.
The black percentage of population residing in each of the 98
workplace zones was included as a proxy for the propensity of employ-
ers to discriminate in favor of or against black workers because of real or
imagined attitudes of the surrounding resident population toward the
employment of blacks. Airline distance from the ghetto boundaries was
included as a proxy for the transportation cost and information impedi-
ments to black employment at workplaces distant from the ghetto.43
To provide a crude test of the hypothesis that housing-market
discrimination reduces black employment, Kain solved these and similar
equations using the convenient counterfactual assumption that blacks
resided in every residence zone at the same proportion as their propor-
tion in the total population. This procedure suggested thatjob losses from
housing-market segregation could be as large as 24,622 for Chicago and
9,113 for Detroit. More realistic assumptions, that took into account the
socioeconomic characteristics of the black population, would have pro-
duced larger estimates of job loss. Obviously, as Kain makes clear in
both his original paper and subsequent references to it, the particular
numerical results are quite speculative.
43There is some limited evidence that the use of travel time or a weighted average of
travel time and cost would reveal an even stronger relationship between black employment
and workplace accessibility to the ghetto. In an unpublished analysis of EEOC (Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission) data for Chicago, Robert B. McKersie of the
University of Chicago computed simple regressions between the ratio of black to total
employment in each of 25workplacezones and the separation of these zones from the
ghetto in terms of distance, automobile travel time, and cost (including both the money and
time costs of automobile commutation). The equation using distance had a coefficient of
determination of. 199, while the one for auto travel time was .504 and the one for cost was
.403. Robert B. McKersie, "Affirmative Action and Analytical Probing of EEOC Data"
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The final part of the analysis considered the effects of employment
dispersal on black employment. For Chicago, sufficient data were avail-
able to test directly some of the model's predictions about the effects of
postwar employment and population shifts on black employment.
The Chicago SMSA had approximately 3,000 fewer manufacturing
jobs in 1950 than in 1960, and these fewer jobs were on average located
further from the ghetto. Even so, a disproportionate number of jobs
remained in the central city at the end of the period, and with the
expansion of the ghetto large numbers of white workers moved away
from these centrally located jobs. (During the decade, the black popula-
tion within 15 miles of the centroid of the ghetto increased by 319,000,
while the white population declined by 261,000.) These outward shifts of
the white resident population would be expected to improve the labor
market position of blacks relative to whites at central workplace.
To provide a crude indication of the net impact of these offsetting
trends, Kain estimated regression equations for total manufacturing
employment and solved them using 1950 and 1960 values of population
and employment by geographic location. The estimated changes in black
manufacturing employment during the period obtained from this proce-
dure corresponded to a remarkable degree to the actual changes. Black
manufacturing employment in the Chicago SMSA declined by about
2,000 between 1950 and 1960; the estimated declines in black manufac-
turing employment ranged from 4,000 to 7,000, depending on the model
specification employed. Both the actual and projected experience then
implies unfavorable (for blacks) declines in the ratio of black to all
manufacturing employment during the ten-year period.
Publication of Kain's 1968 paper stimulated a considerable amount
of research on the effects of housing-market discrimination on urban
labor markets and a number of critiques that claimed to refute one or
more of the hypotheses advanced in that paper. Some of the more
prominent of these analyses or critiques are those by the late Joseph
Mooney, by Paul Offner and Daniel Saks, by Roger Noll, by Bennett
Harrison, and most recently by Stanley Masters.44 There is, however,
4'Roger No!!, "Metropolitan Employment and Population Distribution and the Con-
ditions of the Urban Poor," in Financing the Metropolis, The Urban Affairs Annua!
Review, Vol. 4, John P. Crecine, ed. (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc. 1970) pp. 481—
509; Joseph D. Mooney, "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan
Decentralization," Quarterly Journal of Economics 83, no. 2 (May 1969): 299—311; and
Bennett Harrison, "The Intrametropolitan Distribution of Minority Economic Welfare,"
Journal of Regional Science 12, no. 1 (1972): 23—43; Paul Offner and Daniel H. Saks, "A
Note on John Kain's 'Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decen-
tralization," Quarterly Journal of Economics 85, no. 1 (Feb. 1971): 147—60; Stanley H.
Masters, "A Note on John Kain's 'Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metro-j
politan Decentralization,'" from Quarterly Journal of Economics 88, no. 3 (August
1974): 505— 12.90 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
no controversy about the paper's central finding: that limitations on
black residence choices reduce the level of employment at workplaces
distant from the ghetto. Indeed, this result has been confirmed by several
subsequent investigations of varying degrees of quantitative sophistica-
tion. On the other hand, the findings that racial discrimination in urban
housing markets is a contributory cause of higji levels of black unem-
ployment and low black earnings, and that employment dispersal has
aggravated the situation, have created considerable controversy and
must be regarded as being on less firm ground than the simple proposi-
tion that it affects the location of black employment.45
SUMMARY
Thischapter investigates the ways in which racial prejudice, dis-
crimination, and segregation affect the behavior of urban housing mar-
kets. We begin with an investigation of the possible explanations of the
widely documented persistence of segregation by race in American
cities. After reviewing the available evidence, we conclude that only a
small portion of residential segregation can be attributed to socioeco-
nomic differences between black and white households. In addition, the
historical analogies between the experiences of immigrant colonies in
American cities and the experiences of urban black households seem
invalid. Finally, there is no evidence that the observed levels of residen-
tial segregation arise from the desire for self-segregation by blacks. We
thus conclude that racial discrimination and prejudice are the principal
explanations of the observed patterns of racial segregation.
The analysis then investigates the pricing of housing services in the
black ghetto and in the unrestricted housing market available to white
households. If residential segregation arises because of the prejudice of
white households, conventional economic analysis would suggest that
housing prices are higher in the unrestricted (white) submarket than in
the ghetto. In fact, as noted in this chapter the preponderance of
empirical evidence suggests that the prices of comparable dwelling units
are higher in the ghetto than in the white submarket.
45A survey and evaluation of the studies bearing on these questions is published
elsewhere. John F. Kain, "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan
Decentralization: A Retrospective View," in Patterns of Racial Vol. 1:
Housing, George M. von Furstenberg et al, eds. (Lexington: Lexington Books of D.C.
Heath, Co., 1974). A briefer survey and evaluation of these questions is presented in John
F. Kain, "Reply to Stanley Master's Comment on 'Housing Segregation, Negro Employ-
ment, and Metropolitan Decentralization,'" Quarterly Journal of Economics 88, no. 3
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This conflict indicates the limited applicability of the comparative
static (or long-run equilibrium) analysis of housing markets and eco-
nomic discrimination. Since previously occupied housing is about four
times as important as new construction as a source of additions to the
ghetto housing supply, a principal determinant of the level of prices in
the black submarket is the price at which units can be shifted from white
to black occupancy.
The analysis then investigates these prices in terms of the markup
which must be paid to shift dwelling units from the white to the black
submarket. Several formulations of the discrimination markup provide
explanations of the level of housing prices in the ghetto and of the
peripheral expansion of the ghetto housing market in urban areas. This
formulation also permits an analysis of the boundary effects and short-
run dynamics of the housing market in transition areas where dwelling
units are being transferred from white to black occupancy. A survey of
the empirical literature on the behavior of housing prices in transition
areas also appears consistent with this view of the determination of price
levels.
Because the expansion of the black housing supply typically occurs
at the periphery of the existing ghetto in the central city, several other
effects of racial discrimination can be identified. First, since the relative
supply of high-quality dwelling units in better neighborhoods is in very
short supply at the periphery of the ghetto, we may expect that higher-
quality units may be far more expensive in the black submarket than in
the white market. That is, although the "average" housing unit may be
more expensive in the black submarket than in the white submarket,
high-quality units may be substantially more expensive, or indeed com-
pletely unavailable to black households. The analysis also indicates that
a further effect of discrimination in housing markets is a demand for
central-city properties that is only weakly related to accessibility consid-
erations. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the indirect
effects of residential segregation upon the level and distribution of black
employment. The analysis suggests that the secular trend of workplace
decentralization, the segregated central location of black residences, and
the characteristics of transportation systems in urban areas combine to
reduce black employment levels and exacerbate the underrepresentation
of blacks in the rapidly growing suburban ethployment centers.